If taken as it is, with or without speculation, these things are apparent as definite archetypes in the story, to be taken as such, since, following the formerly blind man, that is simply what and the way the story tells it: first, God is the initiator of the whole thing; second, the works of God are the proofs of God and will not be bound to doubters but the works will confound them; third, it is not the “restored sight” that is one’s belief in the Son of God, but the belief is an added thing, on top of the original work – that is, the work of faith. This latter tells us that we could go on and on like this, manifestation after manifestation of wonders, but they will not at any point, intrude upon the positive reality of the movement of your free will to believe. Thus there can be no ground where the refusal of belief, or the existence of non-belief, can ever be taken in itself as proof against the existence of God – as though the mere fact that there may be difficulty or struggle or apparent absurdity involved with coming even to some understanding of the possible existence of a hypothetical God proves that there is no God, or no proofs. Not without the denial of free will.
So, the intent here is not for the proof of the existence of God, but to show the particular forms that the proofs of God will take, if proofs there are. Or more to the point: to show the very fact that the proofs of God will have positive, self-substantive form. Even form in opposition to explication. They will have a life of their own as it were. As St. Thomas Aquinas relates, that naturally to us, every virtue of God is of manifest difference (i.e., Temperance, chastity, hope), but while in God, they are God Himself. Meaning a proof of God will have an “endless” quality about it, as in an extension of His infinity, into our finiteness, into our finite world.
Suppose what we meant by proof, to God meant, “proof not good enough”. We expect God to be so distant and at the same time act as though having proof of God would, or should, be no different than having proof of any other thing.
They (the proofs) will have in themselves a micro-creation of a kind that, as it builds, would sooner confound, by way of further creation, the non-believer rather than stop and explain. There are the scriptural words about God’s word being a two-edged sword: if there is a God, then how could God, or why would God more exactly, being God, positively work proofs that turn in upon themselves as explication? Not only would it be practically and aesthetically anti-climactic; not only would it be logically inconsistent; it would not be proof.